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When Stalin died in 1953, Christina Stead wrote to her brother Gilbert about
the great event, “so strange and so close to millions!” She remarked that, though
to some Stalin was an “anti-Christ,” “to a lot of others he stood for the Soviet
world” (Web of Friendship 135). Stead herself held the latter view, and continued
to hold it throughout her life, though as the twentieth century wore on that
would seem an increasingly perverse and untenable position. Her apparently
unshakeable belief in Stalin provides, I think, an intriguing contrast to the rigours
of what she called, in a letter to Nettie Palmer, her novel of “the Judas time” (Web
of Friendship 121), I’m Dying Laughing. The novel is at once savagely satirical and
deeply sympathetic about the fall from moral and political grace of renegade
American writers Emily Wilkes and Stephen Howard. The text lingers over radically
competing accounts of a revolutionary history, a dream of history turned to
nightmare in the Cold War era.
My reading of the politics of I’m Dying Laughing finds conducive Judith Kegan
Gardiner’s view that Stead “was both ahead of her time and permanently shaped
by the Marxist orthodoxies of the 1930s” (22). Recognising the complex mix of
progressive and orthodox strands in Stead’s political thought, I focus on how
contradictory impulses structure her narrative, determining relationships among
author, characters and reader. Yet, in her essay on I’m Dying Laughing, Susan
Sheridan argues that while Stead’s protagonist, Emily, wants her novel—the “book
within the book”—to capture the elusive “moment of revolution,” Stead herself
appears less interested in the gladiatorial spirit of revolution, and more focused on
“art and politics under capitalism” (50). While this reading is compelling, my
own discussion of the narrative’s political frame attributes a greater weight to the
theme of revolution in Stead’s book. It is precisely through the ambivalent
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representation of Emily as counter-revolutionary woman, I argue, that the strength
of Stead’s own political views is to be discerned. Encompassing and framing Emily’s
“magnum dopus,” the narrative of I’m Dying Laughing sustains a normative
distinction, consistent with its author’s adherence to Stalinist ideology, between
what Angela Carter has described as “romantic, soft-edged and visionary” Anglo-
American socialism and a “rational,” “anticlerical,” harder-edged European socialism
(Snitow 16–17). This distinction—most compellingly manifest in the narrative’s
abjections—is structural to the production of I’m Dying Laughing, providing
fascinating, if contradictory, evidence of the durability—even obduracy—of Stead’s
pro-Soviet political beliefs.
The vision of post-holocaust Western culture that emerges in Julia Kristeva’s
study of abjection, Powers of Horror, shares much with Stead’s vision of postwar
America and Europe in I’m Dying Laughing. Focusing on the fragile borders of
subjectivity and culture, both texts respond to the collapse of enlightenment
values—of revolutionary optimism—in the wake of the genocidal horror of
totalitarianism. The abjection that, Kristeva argues, is foundational to identity
and culture persists at the edges of Stead’s narrative, revealing and contaminating
the author’s pro-Soviet beliefs. It is not my argument that Stead, herself, entertained
serious political doubts of her own—on the contrary. It is rather that the giddying
material of her novel reproduces the tracery of a belief system poised at the edge of
its own implosion. The volcanic ideological pressure of I’m Dying Laughing is, I
believe, what endows it with its extraordinary power; such pressure may well have
contributed to Stead’s own failure to complete the novel—something usually
explained on other grounds (see, for example, R. G. Geering’s “I’m Dying Laughing:
Behind the Scenes”).
Though a number of commentators justly observe the heteroglossia or
heterogeneity of Stead’s narratives, I would draw attention to Michael Holquist’s
remark that Mikhail Bakhtin himself understood that in novelistic discourse the
breaking of frames presupposes the continuing presence and power of frames.1 So,
too, even amid the heterogeneity of her narratives, Stead imposes, in subtle ways,
a normative frame of judgement, one which is both moral and political. Two quite
different statements Stead herself made about a book that so resisted her efforts of
closure can be invoked to exemplify this point. These statements encapsulate the
novel’s contradictory pulses, highlighting variant expectations about whether and
how its protagonists are to be judged:
It was all about the passion of—I use passion in almost the religious
sense—of two people, two Americans, New Yorkers, in the thirties.
They are doing well, but they suffered all the troubles of the thirties.
They were politically minded. They went to Hollywood. They came
to Europe to avoid the McCarthy trouble. Of course they were
31
deeply involved. And then, they lived around Europe, oh, in a wild
and exciting extravagant style. But there was nothing to support it.
At the same time they wanted to be on the side of the angels, good
Communists, good people, and also to be very rich. Well, of course
[. . .] they came to a bad end. (qtd. in Geering, Preface vi–vii)
Stead highlights the biblical dimension of her narrative, invoking the morality-
play fall of the angels. Emily’s and Stephen’s political plight is thus transposed
into a frame of judgement, theological and primal, involving rebellion against the
Father, loss of paradise, and endurance of eternal exile. As aspirants to revolutionary
heroism, the fall of these angels into political betrayal and moral cynicism is
devastating, yet the analogy means that their “bad end” is also inevitable—a
foreseeable and foregone conclusion.
In a second statement, however, Stead speaks of wanting to feed her narrative’s
burning ferocity. Here her emphasis falls not on divine judgement, but on
temporally unfolding intensity of suffering and horror: “I meant it to go on from
fire to more fiery to fierier still; it has a very terrible dramatic end, I wanted it to
be a build-up all the way through” (qtd. in Geering, Preface viii).
Stead’s authorial commentary parallels an oscillation in the novel itself between
an invitation to judgement of its fallen angels and the awful, gorgeous scene of
human suffering—a combination of sympathy and irony recognized as
characteristic of her writing (Lidoff 56). The simultaneous exercise of sympathy
and detachment is magnificently demonstrated in I’m Dying Laughing. Indeed, it
is through the maintenance of this complex stance towards its protagonists, Emily
and Stephen, that the narrative’s own defining frame of judgement becomes
apparent. It is, however, in the abjection accompanying the maintenance of this
stance that such judgement is finally destabilized and the fixity of political belief
called into question.
In discussing the abject in the novel, and the novel’s own abjections, I first
draw attention, as my title suggests, to the significance of its recurrent trope of
crossing. The idea of “crossing” presupposes a border or divide—an abyss or gap.
As well as the “abyss” itself, “crossing” therefore signals the uneasy conjunction of
apparently divided states. In the narrative, these divided or opposed states can be
identified as, on the one hand, the moral rectitude of strong revolutionary belief
and, on the other, the giddying abjection that accompanies the maintenance of
such strong belief even as the tide of history turns against it. In I’m Dying Laughing,
crossings occur in multiple and contradictory forms—geographic, temporal,
cultural, political and subjective. The narrative crosses, for instance, in time, from
pre- to postwar eras. After the opening three chapters set in 1935, the narrative
overleaps the terrible abyss of war and fascism, resuming with “UNO 1945.” The
marriage of Emily and Stephen crosses class boundaries. The couple crosses from
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one side of the USA to the other, before crossing from the USA to Europe. They
then cross from affiliation with French communists and resistance workers to
alignment with renegades, criminals and Nazi collaborators. Cumulatively, this
series of crossings effects a frenzied narrative propulsion. Yet countering this drive
is the stalling of narrative momentum through repetition and contradiction.
Crossings repeat themselves, becoming internalized in corporeal, psychic and abject
forms. Repetition and return—the constant recurrence of fascist terror in dinner
party conversation, for instance—steep the narrative in the imagery and processes
of abjection.
In a prescient moment, Stephen compares their plight with Julius Caesar’s
crossing of the Rubicon, an act of treason that led to the downfall of the Republic
and ushered in Empire:
He felt his gorge rise. He foresaw their slow separation from the Party,
the beliefs of the Roosevelt era. He had a suspicion that Emily, who
had jibbed at all marking time or trimming, would throw herself
bodily over the Rubicon, would jump, laughing and hurrahing, the
narrow deep river while he might forever hesitate on the banks. (275)
The Ancient Roman Republic’s capitulation to imperialism is here analogous
to the American Communist Party’s self-serving capitulation to nationalism in
the Roosevelt and McCarthy eras. Thus, in this early part of the narrative, the
Howards are in trouble with their Hollywood comrades because they resist the
Party’s politically flawed doctrine, challenging its deviation from international
socialism and from European communist thought. The implied privileging of
internationalist over Roosevelt-era communism is also clear later, when Suzanne,
Vittorio and Party comrades generously welcome the ostracized American couple,
newly arrived in France, as fellow internationalists.
But this ostensibly worthy reason for the couple’s ejection from the American
Party is already shadowed by another that brings about their moral and political
downfall—their reckless hedonism, and their use of Stephen’s daughter Olivia to
maintain access to his family’s wealth (an inheritance constantly threatened by the
couple’s political clash with Anna, the Howard family matriarch). The couple’s
subsequent flight to Europe, therefore, does not resolve their political problems,
but escalates them, precipitating a far more threatening series of crossings. Echoing
the Macbeths, the reckless husband and wife who, having murdered the good father/
king, now wish to “jump the life to come” (Shakespeare, Macbeth I.vii.5–7), Emily
and Stephen may dream of revolution—of crossing to that beautiful country—but
their negative trajectory is fatally conditioned by their desire for consumer luxury
and affluence. Thus they can never rid themselves of a primal fear of revolutionary
struggle, and of the necessary terror of “the tumbrils.” As romantics, idealists and
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American writers, Emily and Stephen have no stomach for the privation, sacrifice or
martyrdom that historically accompanies such struggle. So, like the Macbeths, they
attempt to outrun or overleap such a fate. The holy drive towards a revolutionary
subjectivity falls rapidly into the abyss of counter-revolution.
In I’m Dying Laughing, the abyss of terror to be crossed is corporeally configured
in Emily’s body and laughter. Emily is the narrative site of an abjection that, in
Kristeva’s account, always accompanies the maintenance of the subject, of culture
and—I’d argue in relation to Stead’s novel—of belief in revolution. Far from
overleaping the abyss, Emily is thrust within manifold contradiction: Emily
inhabits the abyss and the abyss inhabits Emily, so that she is abject. But abjection
spreads beyond the novel’s protagonist. Her abjections make Emily function as
“the scalpel within,” as the instrument with which the text performs a displaced
anatomy of that which it does not wish to know—its own “jettisoned object.”
This process draws it close “to the place where meaning collapses” (Kristeva 2)—
to the crimes of the Soviet regime and the corruption of the revolutionary ideal.
What, precisely, is abject in Stead’s novel? Terms like horror or guilt do not—
I think—suffice, though horror and guilt are characteristically linked with abjection.
For Kristeva, the threat of the abject derives from its impossible status as neither
subject nor object. Rather, it is “ejected beyond the scope of the possible, the
tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there, quite close, but it cannot be assimilated”
(1). Experiences, images or encounters that, on a daily basis, call up the repressed
from the unconscious, serving to remind the self of its own transiently constructed
nature, without which it would fall into the abyss of non-being, are termed “abject.”
Abjection is both the principle of cohesion and the threat of fragmentation.
Both Emily and Stephen react viscerally against abject things, exhibiting
inordinate fear of contamination. Their bouts of optimism about them soon being
unambiguously welcomed back into the revolutionary fold are often followed by
some episode of irrational loathing directed at those suffering material hardship,
or those offending against their living standards. Stephen finds virtuous Resistance
workers like Vittorio and Suzanne irritating (267); he gravitates instead to high-
living collaborators, renegades or criminals, like Johnny and Violet Trefougar.
Likewise, Emily rages, in a symptomatic scene, against a starving cat that she
finds licking an unwashed baking tray: “She took the cat by the scruff of the neck
and hauled it to the door [. . .]. It had just had kittens. It was almost starved to
death. She threw it on the hillside which rose behind the house” (113).
For Kristeva, food scraps typify abjection (76–77). The cat’s visible need prompts
an irrational loathing, and Emily’s actions demonstrate a compulsive fear of the
other, of what is residual to or excluded from her domestic order. Imperfection in
a menu, the sight of plain food, or spectral images of the hungry masses “clawing
at the cobblestones” of Versailles (423) increasingly preoccupy and disgust Emily.
The starving cat represents the condition Emily must exclude from her home and
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her self. Ironically, the ejection of the cat from the house to the cold hillside
prefigures Emily’s own fate.
Stephen and Emily are not merely sensitive to abjection: they themselves
become abject—bodies that offend because they inhabit and incorporate
boundaries. They are strays—“dejects” in Kristeva’s terminology (8). In the double
bind of their belonging to uppercrust society and to the Hollywood branch of the
Communist Party, they stray from righteousness. Ultimately they stray from the
category of the true communist—a category relayed in the text by characters like
Ruth and Axel Oates, Vittorio and Suzanne, all loyal to the Howards, but also
unsentimental, undeluded and committed revolutionaries.
Abjection accompanies the narrative’s exhibition of a kind of voyeurism, a
pleasurable disgust about Emily’s body. Emily represents what Kristeva calls the
maternal abject (12–13, 54). Her body’s fatness, fullness, permeability—its
otherness to the hygienically-bordered, “clean and proper” body—signals excessive
“femininity.” Associated, as many have argued, with Rabelais’ Gargantua, Emily’s
body is indeed potentially revolutionary as its carnivalistic excess disrupts symbolic
order. Yet the category of the “carnivalesque” is not quite adequate here. Emily’s
body is far more painfully riven, functioning, I believe, to figure and displace
abjection. Emily more closely resembles Kristeva’s “deject,” a “tireless builder”
who casts “within [herself ] the scalpel that carries out [her] separations;” her
laughter, erupting at the point of deepest horror, is a strategy for “placing or
displacing abjection” (8).
Through Emily, Stead’s text purveys horrors. These horrors, accompanying
and producing the narrative’s sense of moral and political boundaries, must be
crossed or overleapt. Horror fissures coherence of belief in the Soviet system, a
normative belief otherwise apparent in the political values to which Emily and
Stephen aspire. During a conversation with old friends, Axel and Ruth Oates,
and the rather world-weary British reporter Des Canby, Emily and Stephen declare
their fidelity to the Soviet cause in its triumphant progress through history:
Emily said, “Oh, yes, indeed. We’re still on that all-stations train.
That omnibus. How many stops has that train got, that started at
the Finland station in March 1917? At every whistle-stop people got
off. Not us.”
Stephen said, “Romantics and mystics and people like ourselves
looking for new energy, a new aim from the revolution. All there
with a personal aim. Well, we’re still on the train that started at the
Finland station.” (183)
Somewhat listlessly, Des Canby replies: “Ah, the omnibus! The crimes of the
Soviet Union! I know the full calendar. The ones that dropped off at each station
35
as you put it, throng like all the dead of the world” (183).
In the familiar narrative of Lenin’s train ride, episodes of revolutionary terror
are recast as mere whistle-stops or stations along the way. Thronging like the dead
are the renegades who got off early. Among her very detailed notes on Arthur
Koestler’s The God That Failed—a famous 1949 collection of testimonies by
prominent ex-communists—Stead records Louis Fischer’s use of the Finland train
narrative.2 Referring to the Soviets’ ominous and bloody repression of a 1921
uprising on the Island of Kronstadt, Fischer explains that: “The Soviet–Nazi Pact
was ‘Kronstadt’ for me. Others did not ‘leave the train’ to stop at ‘Kronstadt’
until Russia invaded Finland in 1939.” “Kronstadt” here becomes a metonymic
term for the believer’s signal moment of awakening to Soviet betrayal of the
revolution. As their resistance to Hollywood communism initially promises, Emily
and Stephen want to resist Fischer’s awakening, aspiring to stay aboard the Soviet
train. But once they arrive in Europe they become derailed from this commitment
by their own American “sentiment,” “softness” and predilection for luxury. Emily
and Stephen stray from European communist circles—less because of outrage
against any particular Soviet crime than because they are mired ever more deeply
in the contradiction between their political beliefs and consumerist lives.
The devout Soviet train ride is thus swiftly overwritten in Emily’s discourse by
another metaphor—that of an American road journey into darkness:
“all the stages on the road to socialism, all the turnoffs, all the
milestones, until you get to the one that says, No Turning Back. Oh,
what a shudder! I’d like to stand on that road and look up at that
signpost. From here no way back. What would be my real feelings? I
mean, without romance, without hazy illusions, without the idea
that one day if it didn’t suit I could go back to the USA? It’s a fearful
idea. For us all, socialism, even Russian Marxist socialism, is a
somewhat Utopian dream; but there—at the dread signpost—”
She laughed. (252)
Here, with syntax arrested at the prospect of the “dread signpost” and with the
eruption of Emily’s laughter, political commitment wavers on the brink of an
abyss. The road journey to nightmare is later transfigured, and literally experienced,
when Emily and Stephen are drawn in by the reckless and disorderly Violet and
Johnny Trefougar, accompanying them on a smuggling trip. As well as intensifying
the thematic of border crossing, this detour into criminal territory marks the
increasing corruption of Emily’s and Stephen’s revolutionary energies.
The extreme tension between revolutionary certainties and the impossibility of
closure that marks the narrative’s own abjection is manifested in at least two key
moments in the text. The first relates to Emily’s letter of renunciation to the
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Oates; the second appears in the conversation already referred to, among the
Howards, the Oates and Des Canby, who jokingly enumerate the crimes of the
Soviet Union.
Striking a Faustian deal with Anna, Emily writes letters of recantation and
renunciation to all her radical friends and associates. Her letter to Ruth and Axel
Oates argues the case against revolutionary socialism in terms eloquently
reminiscent of The God That Failed, pleading that the Oates “be good to us, try to
understand us and know that we did not act from the base motives we are accused
of” (403). Undercutting Emily’s appeal, however, is what she has absentmindedly
scribbled at the bottom of her note: $30,000. It seems impossible to decide
between these baldly competing pieces of evidence. Does the Judas-like sum of
$30,000 empty all integrity from the arguments Emily articulates in her letter?
Or does the letter’s compelling rhetoric demand equal hearing?
Are there no innocent martyrs whatever in the bloody dark unrevealed chronicle
of Bolshevik history, no innocent people afraid to return to their loved country for
fear of a rope or a shot in the dark? No people hauled out of bed and brought
suddenly up on strange charges, ignorant of the denouncer, the accuser? (401)
Emily’s letter not only addresses the bloody terror of revolution, but brings
home the relevance of this problem to the question of what constitutes revolutionary
literature:
Take Danton. Or Cicero. Their friends were overwhelmed by their
characters, their own characters, rich, various, tortured, intricate and
noble because human. They fill the soul with a great nostalgia
because they are right, somehow entirely right. Reason, the fullness
of humanity is so little considered in our doomsday world, that it is
like a shock to discover man afresh. (403)
The irony here is obvious. Emily is Stead’s Danton or Cicero. Her self-
consciousness erodes sure judgement, inviting sympathy, complicity. At odds with
orthodox socialist realism prevalent in the 1930s and 1940s, Emily’s argument
that the artist must discover man afresh is compelling. Stead’s own narrative bears
witness to the truth of Emily’s argument, since Emily herself—“rich, various,
tortured, intricate and noble”—is precisely the object of Stead’s narrative’s gaze.
As things spiral out of control, Emily begins planning her blockbuster novel about
the French Revolution. She turns for inspiration to Theodore Dreiser’s 1925 An
American Tragedy. Even as Stephen rages about their deepening debt, Emily is
gripped by Dreiser’s portrait of Clyde Griffith, whose desire for upward class
mobility leads to his murderous complicity in drowning a factory worker pregnant
with his child. Emily cries: “Oh Stephen, to choose such a doomed soul! Listen,
Stephen! Like us, perhaps! He makes you feel it is like us. [. . .] to show this severe
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terrible compassion—such compassion, oh, is terror, terror” (351).
Emily realizes that Dreiser’s severe and terrible compassion is the mark of the
true artist, the true revolutionary artist who refuses to shrink from unpleasant
truths and whose generosity and courage compel him to convey the wrenching
emotional truth of humanity. Dreiser’s terrible compassion is correlative with
Stead’s own in I’m Dying Laughing. Fastening its severe (because compassionate)
gaze upon Emily and Stephen, the narrative skirts the nightmare admission that
the worker’s revolution is drained of credibility. Its gaze upon these failed renegades
abets its avoidance of more threatening failures, failures implicating stalwart
Stalinists who did stay on that train from Finland station in 1917.
Near the end of Powers of Horror, Kristeva identifies the laughter of Celine as a
response to abjection in which horror is not just confronted, but incorporated.
This laughter is a “gushing forth of the unconscious”—“neither jovial, nor trustful,
nor sublime, nor enraptured by pre-existing harmony. It is bare, anguished, and
as fascinated as it is frightened” (205–06). Stead’s narrative approaches such a
condition. What is both conveyed and obscured by her narrative gaze upon Emily
is an extremely unpalatable version of history. That history is briefly articulated in
a second and concluding example, from the ensuing conversation among
sympathetic comrades. Overcoming initial embarrassment at having broached
this dangerous topic, the Howards, Des Canby and the Oates compete with each
other, hysterically, to enumerate the betrayals of the Soviet Union. They begin “to
shout and crow and to throw dates and events at each other” (184). Their hysterical
laughter opens onto a horror otherwise contained, suppressed and held—but
only just—at the borders of Stead’s text. Dragged into view is the spectre of a
revolution now blighted, corrupted, betrayed. Emily is permitted, momentarily,
to think the unthinkable, and an intolerable knowledge briefly, with a brutally
casual air, enters the text: “Well, honestly there have been moments when my
heart failed. By golly, what a canticle you have made! [. . .] It’s quite a record, isn’t
it? [. . .] Well—heigh-ho! History doesn’t bear scrutiny” (185). Horror surfaces
but submerges again, returning as Emily’s counter-revolutionary discourse, and
monstrously embodied as she transforms herself into Marie Antoinette.
During the last chapters of the novel, Emily becomes entirely abject. Her novel
and her personal affairs incomplete, she is last seen as a homeless stray, having set
up her home on the steps of the Forum Romanum, the forlorn site of the lost
Roman Republic, and the scene of both the origin and ruin of Western civilization:
This old woman, with the straggling half-grey hair, the droll,
hanging-fat face, the untidy silk suit [. . .]. She had a handbag on
her lap and beside her a worn valise, of snakeskin with gold fittings,
which lay open. Some loose papers lay on the steps and in her lap
were letters it seemed. (446)
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Emily’s body—aged yet only half-grey—performs ambiguity and contradiction.
The “scalpel” of “separations” cast within is now manifested in the disorder of her
belongings and in her visibly torn, divided body.
Yet it is only with Emily as narrative “scalpel” that Stead permits herself the
forbidden luxury of delving into an otherwise unthinkable complicity. Her fictional
character incorporates the laughing apocalypse, representing even as she displaces
not only the despair and horror of the postwar years, but also, it would seem, the
difficulty for a generation of committed Marxists of reconciling with their beliefs
the mounting evidence of Soviet atrocities. Temporarily staving off, therefore, the
terror of final judgement, Emily and Stephen endure and abjectly figure the
unendurable position of the fallen angels in a theological system that, while still
holding them in place, is—for all practical purposes—permanently evacuated of
god. “A laughing apocalypse,” says Kristeva, “is an apocalypse without god” (206).
Endnotes
 1 In his introduction to Speech Genres and Other Late Essays, Holquist reasons
that Bakhtin’s notebooks “are a useful corrective [. . .] to the carnivalistic
image of Bakhtin now abroad, for they come back again and again to the
power of frames” (xix).
2 Christina Stead Papers, NLA MS 4967, Box 12, Folder 87; see also Koestler
222. Stead’s notes are fascinating and revealing. Each closely-typed page of
notes on The God that Failed bears the curious heading, “Eight Rogues.”
Presumably this is Stead’s scathing characterisation of the six contributors
(Arthur Koestler, Ignazio Silone, Richard Wright, André Gide, Louis Fischer
and Stephen Spender) along with the editor, Richard Crossman, and Dr
Enid Starkie (who introduced Gide’s essay). Stead’s heading is the single
but quite unmistakable sign of her contempt for the book’s contributors.
Otherwise her notes suggest her immersion in the task of combing the book
for insights into what motivated the change of heart of these former comrades.
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